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Abstract Since 2004, most municipalities in the Netherlands receive lump sum pay-
ments from the state for the payment of social assistance allowances. Asmunicipalities
had no authority to change the eligibility rules for social assistance, the effects of the
welfare reform are solely due to the efforts of municipalities to decrease the num-
ber of welfare recipients. Using variation in the timing of policy changes, this paper
uses a difference-in-difference approach to assess the effectiveness of the incentive
for municipalities. Based on individual panel data from administrative records, we
show that the high-powered scheme led to a decline of the welfare caseload of 14%
up till 2008. The reform has been most effective for those with the highest welfare
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dependency: single mothers and singles from non-western origin. In line with standard
economic predictions, the reform does not give an incentive for cream skimming: the
welfare caseload declined as well for easy to place recipients as for difficult to place
recipients.
Keywords Decentralisation ·Welfare caseload · Financial incentive · Principal agent
JEL Classification H53 · I38 · H75
1 Introduction
There is a substantial body of literature measuring the effects of welfare reforms on
the number of welfare recipients. Most of them deal with the effects of reforms that
stimulate welfare recipients to increase their search effort to find a job. These reforms
typically include financial incentives for welfare recipients to find a job by reducing
benefit levels and introducing sanctions for those recipients not searching sufficiently
(Gautier and Van Der Klaauw 2012).
In contrast to this little is known on the effectiveness of financial incentives for the
agencies that are responsible for the re-employment of those on welfare. Incentives
in the public sector are usually low-powered or absent. The argument for this is that
performance is often hard to measure and not directly attributable to the efforts of
the agency (Heinrich and Marschke 2010; Burgess and Ratto 2003). There is a small
body of literature on the effects of financial incentives for re-employment providers
contracted by public agencies (Heckman et al. 2002; Koning and Heinrich 2013). As
performance pay for providers usually involves a fixed amount bonus for each recipient
finding work, it imposes incentives that may lead to cream-skimming practices. That
is, these providers may concentrate on individuals with high a priori chances of work,
rather than increasing their work opportunities.
That said, the use of financial incentives may be more adequate when they are
imposed at the level of public agencies that have no opportunities for cream-skimming.
In the current paper, we will study the effectiveness of such financial incentives for
Dutch municipalities that are responsible for the provision of welfare benefits. In the
Netherlands, a major policy reform took place in 2004, giving large municipalities a
high-powered financial incentive to decrease the welfare caseload. With the introduc-
tion of the so-called ‘Work and Social Assistance Act’ in that year, matching grants
for welfare expenditures were replaced by block grants. Before the reform, munici-
palities billed 90% of actual expenses on welfare to the federal government (i.e., a
90% matching grant); the rest had to be financed from a fixed budget based on histor-
ical welfare expenses (i.e. a 10% block grant). This provided municipalities virtually
no incentive to reduce their welfare caseload. From 2004 on, municipalities received
each year a fixed budget that did not vary with respect to the actual caseload in that
year (a 100% block grant). For small municipalities, this fixed budget was based on
historical welfare expenses, which provided them with minimal incentives to reduce
welfare caseloads. For large municipalities however, a substantial part of the block
grant no longer depended on their historical expenses. More specifically, the fraction
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of lump-sum financing increased to 100% in 2006. Accordingly, large municipalities
were fully rewarded with the present value of benefit savings due to work resumption
of their unemployed citizens.
Using administrative data on about 900,000 welfare recipients between 1999 and
2008, we exploit the differential and gradual implementation of the new welfare law
acrossmunicipalities. Our estimation approach can be characterized as a difference-in-
difference model, with small municipalities with minor changes in financial incentives
as ‘control group’ and larger municipalities as the ‘treatment’ group.
The estimation results show that the Dutch welfare reform proofs successful in
reducing the number of welfare recipients. The replacement of a matching grant with
a block grant that is independent of historical expenses reduced the welfare caseload
with 14%. The effect is larger for groups with the largest probability of being on
welfare, particularly single parents. The policy reform also reduced the probability of
being on welfare for a year or longer, indicating that also hard-to-place recipients are
targeted by municipalities. This confirms that cream-skimming did not occur.
Our impact estimates are somewhat lower than those for studies on a similar US
welfare reform that took place in 1998. For these, Blank (2007) andMoffitt (2008) find
impact estimates of about 20%. Before 1996, US states received a matching grant of
40% of welfare expenses from the federal government. The welfare reform replaced
the matching grant by a block grant. The change in financial incentives was thus
smaller than in the Netherlands, where a 90% matching grant was replaced by a block
grant. However, at the same time nationwide eligibility rules were changed in 1996,
including a time limit on the duration of allowances of 5years and more severe work
requirement rules. Moreover, the reform gave states the discretion to pose more severe
eligibility rules and lower benefit levels than stipulated by nationwide regulation. This
means that empirical studies on the 1996 reform essentially measured the combined
impact of financial incentives and changes in benefit conditions. As Grogger (2004)
argues, about 6% of the impact of the reform on the welfare caseload can already be
explained by the impact of time limits for allowances.
With this in mind, this paper thus adds to the literature by estimating the isolated
effect of the replacement of a matching grant by a block grant—and without the pos-
sibility for municipalities of changing eligibility rules or the benefit level. In addition,
we address the issue of cream skimming inmore detail. That is, we investigate whether
changes in welfare dependency rates were confined to welfare caseloads in the first
year of benefit receipt or whether they extend to long-term benefits as well?
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the theoretical effects of
financial incentives from a principal-agent perspective. Section 3 goes into the results
of empirical research on effects of financial incentives to reduce the welfare caseload.
Section 4 describes the institutional context of the welfare reform in the Netherlands.
Sections 5 and 6 describe the data and the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Financial Incentives: Theoretical Considerations
In most western countries, local municipality offices administer welfare (Adema
2006). These offices can hire welfare-to-work providers to help recipients back to
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work. In this context, financial incentives can be given to either providers, or to the
local governments themselves. In both cases, a principal-agent problem arises where
contracting involves a trade-off between risk and incentives (Gibbons 1996; Burgess
and Ratto 2003). Taking welfare caseloads as the relevant measure of output in these
contracts, output is not only influenced by the effort of the agent, but also by other
factors that cannot be influenced by the agent. This is especially true in re-employment
services, with business cycle conditions and unobserved characteristics of clients (like
motivation) as key drivers of job finding rates. Financial incentives based on welfare
caseloads thus impose a risk on agents.
In the context of this paper, performance pay usually takes the form of a linear
contract with a fixed amount A and a bonus B for every client who finds a job:
W = A + By
where W is the income of the agent, y is the output of the agent, A is a fixed amount,
independent of output, and B is the reward per output. In the case of welfare benefits,
the principal (the government) wants to decrease the welfare caseload. Therefore
output (y) is defined as the decrease of the welfare caseload.
In high powered incentive schemes, A is low or zero and B is high, which implies
a high risk for the provider. As agents are usually risk averse, a high risk might induce
the agent not to accept the scheme. On the other hand, if the agent gets paid a fixed
amount (B = 0), independent of the number of recipients who get back to work, there
is no incentive for the agent to reduce the welfare caseload and the principal bears all
risks. The higher the risk and the more risk averse the agent is, the higher A has to be
to induce agents to accept the scheme.
With amatching grant every allowance is paid by the principal, so there is no reward
for a decrease of the welfare caseload (B = 0). Performance pay for providers of re-
employment services usually involves a fixed amount bonus for each recipient finding
work. In a “no cure no pay” contract A = 0 and B is a fixed amount. In a no cure less
pay contract A is a positive amount. A block grant that is independent of expenses
on welfare implies that the agent is rewarded for each recipient finding work with the
present value of the benefits saved. In this case B is thus not a fixed amount, but differs
with respect to the characteristics of the client. For hard-to-place clients the reward is
higher than for easy-to-place clients. A block grant based on historical expenses gives
a reward which will be close to zero. More specifically, the reward is equal to the net
present value of the benefits saved in period t minus the present value of the benefits
saved three periods later. Thus, as soon as the municipality stops making an effort,
the financial gain in the first periods will be lost: expenses go up, while the budget
increases three periods later. If municipalities anticipate this to occur, the incentive to
reduce the welfare caseload will be close to zero. This is commonly referred to as the
ratchet effect (Weitzman 1980).
Cream skimming may occur if the client group is heterogeneous in the probability
of finding a job, while B is fixed. In that case, for those for whom the effort to resume
work is smaller than B are likely to be served first. In addition, ‘parking’ occurs for
those clients for whom the costs of getting them back to work is larger than B: they
have an intake but no further activities take place, so the provider is rewarded with A.
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With this in mind, theory predicts that efforts to place clients in a job as well as
cream skimming is higher in high-powered incentive schemes (high B and low A),
while parking occurs more often in low-powered incentive schemes (high A and low
B). As a block grant does not reward the agent with a fixed amount, but with an amount
which exactly matches future expenses, a block grant will not induce cream skimming,
even though it is a high-powered scheme (A is low or zero).
3 Literature Review
Empirical literature on the effects of financial incentives for private re-employment
providers, contracted by public agencies, focuses on intended and unintended effects
of performance pay, like cream skimming and parking.
The empirical literature shows cream skimming and parking occurs, but not
on a large scale (Heckman et al. 2002; Koning and Heinrich 2013). Koning and
Heinrich (2013) evaluate the effects of high powered incentive schemes for private re-
employment agencies contracted by public agencies in the Netherlands. They find that
high powered schemes for ready to place clients have positive intended effects—the
job-placement rate increased by three percentage point—and hardly any unintended
effects. This is probably because these groups entail little risk for the provider, even
in a high powered incentive scheme. However, cream skimming did occur in high
powered incentives schemes for difficult to place clients with impairments and the
intended effect of an overall higher job-placement rate did not occur. These clients
implied considerable risk for the private agency, as costs to re-employ them are high
and the probability of success low (Koning and Heinrich 2013). Aligning the payment
scheme with the degree of risk the client group entails for the provider thus appears
to be crucial for the overall success of the payment scheme.
An incentive on the level of the municipality in the form of a block grant does
exactly this: aligning the payment scheme with the degree of risk the client group
entails for the agent. Moreover, a block grant independent of expenses does this in
an automatically optimal way: the agent (the municipality) is rewarded by the present
value of benefit savings due to outflow. A likewise incentive might be given at the
level of a provider contracted by the municipality (or any other public agent), but it
will be more difficult to assign the right payment scheme per client group.
Several studies attempt to estimate the effect of the introduction of a 100% block
grant as part of the welfare reform in the US in 1996. The reform entailed a nationwide
change in eligibility requirements. The duration of benefit spells was maximized at
5years. Moreover, more severe work requirements and sanctions for not complying
with these rules were introduced (Blank 2007; Moffitt 2008). The welfare reform
replaced a federal matching grant of 40% of expenses by a block grant and gave
states more discretion about eligibility rules and the benefit level. This provided states
with an incentive to cut expenses, either by decreasing the number of recipients or
by decreasing the benefit level. Grogger and Karoly (2005) estimated a downward
impact of the welfare reform on the welfare caseload of around 20%. The effect of
the introduction of time limits alone already amounted to a decrease of 6–7% of
the welfare caseload (Grogger 2004). This means the effect of a change in financial
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incentives will be no more than 14% (20% minus 6%). Attempts to identify the effect
of the replacement of the matching grant by a block grant try to isolate the change
in incentives from the nationwide changes in eligibility rules (Chernick 1998; Ribar
andWilhelm 1999; Baicker 2005). Estimates vary widely depending on the estimation
strategy. Baicker (2005) estimates the effect of a change from a matching grant to a
block grant at a downward effect on welfare spending of 40%. However, it is not clear
from the research of Baicker (2005), which part of this effect is due to a lower welfare
caseload and which part is due to lower benefits levels.
4 Institutional Context
The Work and Social Assistance Act (WWB) grants a minimum income to anyone
legally residing in the Netherlands who has insufficient means to support him-
self/herself and does not qualify for any other benefit (like an unemployment insurance
benefit or a disability benefit). Welfare allowances are supplied at the level of house-
holds: individuals without income who live together with a partner with adequate
income, or households with sufficient assets, are not eligible. The amount of wel-
fare benefits is related to the statutory minimum wage. A family with two adults gets
100% of the net minimum wage (in 2014 e1350 per month), while single living per-
sons receive 70%ofminimumwage and single parents 90%ofminimumwage. People
who receive welfare are required to accept generally suitable jobs.
In 2014 about 4% of the population between 18 and 65 received awelfare allowance
(Statistics Netherlands, www.cbs.nl). Welfare dependency is lower among native
Dutch people than among migrants. Especially refugees show a high welfare depen-
dency, for some groups even amounting up to 70%. In addition, single parents also
have a high share of welfare recipients, amounting to 22% in 2008. Although people
on welfare have to search for a job, municipalities are free to exempt single parents
with children under 5years of age from this obligation.
The Dutch Ministry of Social affairs and Employment determines the eligibility
rules and the levels of welfare benefits. Municipalities are responsible for the admin-
istration of the Work and Social Assistance Act. Municipalities may influence the
number of persons on welfare by deterring inflow and stimulating outflow by active
labourmarket policies.Municipalities may deter inflow by adopting work first policies
or use so-called search periods. If individuals do not find a job within four weeks, they
are entitled for an allowance starting from the day of their first application. As Bol-
haar et al. (2016) show, this discourages some claimants to show up again after four
weeks. Stimulation of outflow fromwelfare is possible by an active policy on sanction-
ing insufficient search behaviour or fraud. Also, re-employment policies are used to
stimulate outflow. Since the introduction of the policy reform, activities to reduce the
welfare caseload differ substantially between municipalities (Bosselaar et al. 2007).
For instance, policies to reduce the caseload of single parents: some municipalities
use the freedom to exempt single parents from the obligation to search a job, while
others do not and help them actively to find a job (Knoef and Van Ours 2016).
The WWB has been introduced gradually. Up until 2001, municipalities could
claim 90% of welfare expenses from the Ministry (i.e., a matching grant). For the
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other 10% they received a block grant based on historical expenses (in year t−3). As
a consequence, municipalities only had a very limited financial incentive to reduce
the inflow into social security and stimulate the outflow from social security. In 2001,
the part of the budget financed by a matching grant was lowered to 75%, while the
block grant was increased to 25%. With the introduction of the WWB in 2004, the
share of the block grant was further increased to 100% of the budget. For large munic-
ipalities, with more than 60,000 inhabitants, part of the block grant was not based on
historical expenses but was completely independent of welfare expenses. The latter
part increased from 12.5% of the budget in 2002, 25% in 2003, 40% in 2004 to 100%
in 2006. For small municipalities, with less than 25,000 inhabitants, the block grant
was based on historical expenses over the whole period up to 2008. For medium-size
municipalities the part of the block grant independent of historical expenses was in
between large and small municipalities (see Table 1).
Figure 1 illustrates changes in the degree of regression based block grant financing
across municipalities. Large municipalities (with 60,000 or more inhabitants) were
fully financed with a regression based block grant from 2006 onwards and medium-
size municipalities with 40,000 or 50,000 inhabitants from 2007 onwards. Medium-
size municipalities with 30,000 inhabitants were financed only partly (33%) with a
regression based block grant in 2008 (Fig. 1).
The block grant independent of expenseswas based on characteristics thatwere sup-
posed to be exogenous, like the percentage of low educated inhabitants, the percentage
of single parents, the percentage of non-western immigrants and some characteristics
of the labour market. As this part of the block grant is driven by exogenous variables,
it thus gives substantial incentives to reduce the welfare caseloads. In principle, it
rewards municipalities for each recipient finding work with the present value of the
benefits saved. The block grant based on historical expenses on the other hand gives a
reward which will be close to zero, because municipalities will anticipate that the gain
of their efforts will be lost three periods later (see also Toolsema and Allers 2014).
Arguably, the regression based block grant gives an optimal incentive from the
perspective of the municipality: they have an incentive to invest in the outflow of
recipients, up to an amount equal where a marginal increase in the present value of
expected benefit savings is equal to the marginal costs of preventative and reintegra-
tion activities. Following this line of reasoning, easy-to-place clients (i.e., with short
expected benefit durations) will receive less services than hard-to-place clients (i.e.,
with long expected benefit durations). On the other hand, if services for easy-to-place
clients are more effective than those for hard-to-place clients, municipalities may
have an incentive to concentrate on easy to-place clients. Still, this behaviour cannot
be interpreted as cream-skimming, as there is no direct incentive for this. Neither
do municipalities have an incentive for parking, because they pay the allowances for
recipients while parked.
Although financial incentives are optimal from this theoretical perspective,
Toolsema and Allers (2014) argue that, if municipalities operate at different levels
of efficiency, actual welfare expenditures are a biased indicator of spending needs.
Based on a theoretical model, they expect this bias to be small.
Both the regression based block grant and the block grant based on historical
expenses, are calculated as a share of the total budget for welfare. So if the total
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Table 1 Budget shares of welfare expenditures: matching grants, block grants based on historical expenses
and based on regressions
Year Which municipalities Matching
grant (%)
Block grant based
on historical
expenses (%)
Regression
based block
grant (%)
Total
budget
(%)
1999 All 90 10 0 100
2000 All 90 10 0 100
2001 All 75 25 0 100
2002 60,000 or more inhabitants 75 12.5 12.5 100
40,000—60,000 inhabitantsa 75 0–12.5 0–12.5 100
Less than 40,000 inhabitants 75 25 0 100
2003 60,000 or more inhabitants 75 0 25 100
40,000–60,000 inhabitantsa 75 0–25 0–25 100
Less than 40,000 inhabitants 75 25 0 100
2004 60,000 or more inhabitants 0 60 40 100
40.000–60.000 inhabitantsa 0 60–100 0–40 100
Less than 40,000 inhabitants 0 100 0 100
2005 60,000 or more inhabitants 0 27 73 100
40,000–60,000 inhabitantsa 0 27–100 0–73 100
Less than 40,000 inhabitants 0 100 0 100
2006 60,000 or more inhabitants 0 0 100 100
30,000–60,000 inhabitantsa 0 0–100 0–100 100
Less than 30,000 inhabitants 0 100 0 100
2007 40,000 or more inhabitants 0 0 100 100
30,000–40,000 inhabitantsa 0 0–100 0–100 100
Less than 30,000 inhabitants 0 100 0 100
2008 40,000 or more inhabitants 0 0 100 100
25,000–40,000 inhabitantsa 0 0–100 0–100 100
Less than 25,000 inhabitants 0 100 0 100
Source: Van Es (2010)
a This scale is linear. For instance: the budget of amunicipalitywith 35,000 inhabitants in 2007 is determined
for 50% by a regression based block grant and 50% by a block grant on historical expenses
budget declines, the block grants of municipalities decrease even if their shares in the
total budget stay the same. For instance, a municipality receiving a block grant based
on historical expenses receives less budget in year t than the expenses in year t − 3 if
the total budget declined in this period.
5 Data
In our analysis, we employ data at the level of the individuals. Data at the level of
individuals can more accurately control for differences in the characteristics of the
caseload of municipalities (Haider and Klerman 2005). Moreover, using individual
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Fig. 1 Increase of regression based block grant as part of total budget
data enables us to evaluate heterogeneous effects between subgroups of welfare recip-
ients. The dataset contains almost 900,000 individuals, who are followed from 1999
to 2008.
We use two datasets with administrative data that are extracted from Statistics
Netherlands. The first dataset contains demographic information, whereas the sec-
ond dataset contains information about starting and ending dates of welfare benefit
durations. The combined dataset contains high quality, detailed information on demo-
graphics and beginning—and end date of benefit payments for all individuals living in
the Netherlands. For our analysis, we only select individuals aged 18–65, as only they
can be eligible for welfare. In both data files, each person has a unique registration
number, as well as a municipality code depending on the municipality in which they
reside. We use registration numbers to merge data files.
For each quarter of a particular year, each individual in the dataset was assigned
a 1 if receiving welfare at the start of that quarter, and a 0 if not. The population
at risk (18–65years old) consists of 10 million persons, which appear in the dataset
on average 32 times over 36 quarters (because people appear in the dataset when
they reach the age of 18 and disappear when they get 65). As computing capacity
fell short to estimate the model with 10 million persons observed in 32 quarters, we
drew a random sample of 900,000 individuals. On average, we have about 800,000
individuals in each quarter in our sample. The dataset is enriched with local business
cycle indicators and characteristics of municipalities—these are also obtained from
Statistics Netherlands.
Table 2 contains summary statistics of the sample for different municipality size
classes. As explained in Sect. 4, small municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants
do not face a financial incentive from the regression based block grant. Medium-sized
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municipalities receive a budget which is partially based on a regression based block
grant. From2006 onwards, the budget of largemunicipalities is completely determined
with a regression based block grant. The table shows there are large differences in
the probability of being on welfare between municipalities of different sizes. In the
first quarter of 2000, only 1.4% of the population in small municipalities (with less
than 25,000 inhabitants) were on welfare, whereas in large municipalities 5.8% of
the inhabitants were enrolled. Both in small and large municipalities the probability
of being on welfare declined in the period 2000–2008, but at a faster pace in large
municipalities.
In the time period under investigation, the composition of the population on welfare
clearly differed between small and large municipalities. In general, the population on
welfare consisted of individuals that were predominantly single or single parents.
Single parents constituted 33% of the population on welfare in 2008. This differs
not much between municipality class sizes, although in large municipalities single
parents are more often from non-western origin. In 2008 44% of recipients in large
municipalities are non-western immigrants, mainly from Surinam, the Caribbean,
Turkey and Morocco, whereas in small municipalities only 22% of recipients are
non-western immigrants. On average, the share of non-western immigrants in the
population on welfare has increased in the period 2000–2008, from 34 to 39%. The
group with the largest welfare dependency are single parents of non-western origin.
In 2008 they constitute 13% of the population on welfare, while their share in the
population is small, although growing. Of all single parents from non-western origin
37%were on welfare in 2000, declining to 26% in 2008. Of single parents from Dutch
or other western origin 18%were on welfare in 2000 declining to 10% in 2008. Single
households from non-western origin also had a high welfare dependency: 20% in 2000
declining to 15% in 2008. The other groups had much lower probabilities of being on
welfare, less than 10% and couples of Dutch or other non-western origin only 0,4%.
Figure 2 shows that the welfare caseload in the Netherlands declined from 376,000
in 2000 to 267,000 in 2008. Before the introduction of the policy reform in 2002,
the number of welfare recipients declined, probably due to favourable business cycle
conditions. In particular, we observe a strong rise in the vacancy–unemployment ratio
(“lnvu”: the natural logarithm of the vacancy–unemployment ratio) in this period. As
the economy slowed down, the number of recipients rose up to 2005. After 2005,
there has been a substantial decline in the number of recipients, after a once more
booming economy. At the same time, the question rises to what extent the policy
reform contributed to this decline.
Figure 3 shows that the probability of being onwelfare shows the same pattern as the
total welfare caseload in the period 1999–2008. It seems the decline in the probability
of being on welfare is larger in the large municipalities in the period 1999–2002 and
the period 2005–2008.
However, when the probabilities are calculated as indexes, another pattern emerges.
Figure 4 shows that, up to 2002, the probability of being on welfare followed the same
pattern in municipalities of different size classes. This suggests a common trend in
welfare dependency rates in the period before the introduction of the regression based
block grant. From 2003 to 2006 the probability of being on welfare increased rapidly
in small municipalities and decreased afterwards. In large municipalities, there was
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Fig. 2 Welfare caseload and the business cycle. Source: Statistics Netherlands, own calculations
Fig. 3 Development of welfare caseload in municipalities of different size classes, 1999–2008
a small increase in 2003, but afterwards the trend has been steadily downwards. The
development in medium size municipalities was in between small and large munici-
palities. After 2006, we observe a downward trend in welfare dependency across all
size classed of municipalities. It seems the effect of the reform was especially strong
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Fig. 4 Index welfare caseload in municipalities of different size classes, 1999–2008 (1999Q1=100%).
Note Shown is the index of the number of recipients on welfare (1999Q1=100) for municipalities of
different size classes. Source: Statistics Netherlands, own calculations
in large municipalities directly after the reform in 2004 up to 2006, when they faced
the maximum incentive. After 2006, the decline in the probability of being on welfare
seems to follow a similar pattern for municipalities of all size-classes.
6 Empirical Implementation and Estimation Results
6.1 Model Specification
In our analysis, we exploit variation in the incentive scheme over time and between
municipalities, so as to estimate the effect of the policy reform. As the budget that is
based on historical expenses hardly provides municipalities with incentives to reduce
the welfare caseload, the incentive variable for municipalities is proxied by the per-
centage of their budget that consists of a regression based block grant. This percentage
depends on the size of the municipality and the year (see Table 1). Only medium-sized
and large municipalities fully face the strong incentives of a regression based block
grant. The part of the budget which is financed as a regression based block grant has
increased over time for both medium-sized and large municipalities, but in a different
pace for medium-size and large municipalities (see Fig. 1).
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To estimate the impact of the reform, we employ a difference-in-difference
approach. The treatment group consists of all municipalities of which the budget
from a certain point in time has been (partly) financed as a regression based block
grant. The control group consists of small municipalities of which the budget still
inhibited virtually no financial incentives to reduce welfare caseloads. Table 2 shows
that the probability of being on welfare is smaller in small municipalities. More-
over, the composition of the caseload in small municipalities is different from that
in large municipalities. This raises the question if small municipalities are a valid
control group. However, a difference-in-difference strategy does not require that the
treatment and the control group are the same, only that they are expected to have
the same development of welfare dependency in the absence of the policy reform.
Differences in the development of welfare dependency between municipalities most
notably stem from differences in the effect of the business cycle and differences in
the demographic composition of the population. Both are controlled for in our model
specification. Moreover, the model does not only use the differences between small
and larger municipalities to identify the effect of the reform, but also uses the grad-
ual increase in the share of financing with a regression based block grant within the
treatment group.
A difference-in-difference approach assumes a common trend in the development
of the welfare caseload in the treatment group and the control group before the intro-
duction of the reform. Figure 4 suggests there is such a common trend prior to 2002,
the year the first incentives have been introduced. Second, we assume that munic-
ipalities did not anticipate the reform; in the literature, this is often referred to as
the Ashenfelter dip, in which an observed pretrend goes in the opposite direction as
the post-implementation effects of treatment (Ashenfelter 1978; Heckman and Smith
1999). In the current context, an Ashenfelter dip would occur if municipalities would
postpone effort prior to the reform, in order to maximise the reward for effort after
introduction of the policy change. In that case, the effect of the reform would be over-
estimated. However, municipalities have no incentive to postpone effort. They might
even have an incentive to increase effort before the policy reform, because it decreases
the welfare caseload after the policy reform. This would lead to an underestimation
of the effect of the reform. As financial incentives have been introduced gradually, we
expect this anticipation effect to be small. This is confirmed by Fig. 3, which does not
show discontinuities around 2004.
We use an individual fixed effect panel data model to calculate the effect of the
policy reform. A fixed effect panel data analysis incorporates duration dependence
in the individual specific fixed effect. As serial correlation biases the standard errors,
we use robust covariance structure to obtain standard errors of our coefficients. As
Angrist and Pischke (2008) show that with a vast amount of data a linear model
performs equally well as a logit model, we estimated a model with a linear fixed effect
estimator:
yit = β1 pit + β2xit + β3mit + β4uit + β5Yt + ai + εit (1)
• yit indicates if individual i receives welfare at the start of quarter t . It is a binary
variable: 1 if receiving welfare and 0 if not.
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• pit is the variable of interest. It is the percentage of the budget which is financed
with a regression based block grant. This variable varies over time and between
municipalities of different sizes (see Fig. 1).
• xit contains demographic variables, including age, living with a partner and having
children.
• mit is a vector of characteristics of municipalities, including size, province and
degree of urbanisation (on a scale of 1–5).
• ut contains business cycle variables, including quarters within years and the unem-
ployment rate at the level of the region.
• Yt contains the year dummies.
• ai is a time invariant individual specific effect.
• εit is the error term that is assumed to be identically and independently distributed.
6.2 Estimation Results
Table 3 shows the fixed effect estimation results of Eq. (1). The dependent variable
is 1 if someone is on welfare in a quarter and 0 if he or she is not on welfare. It
contains year dummies and dummies that control for the size of the municipality.
Table 3 also shows model outcomes with the probability of being on welfare for four
and eight consecutive quarters as outcome measures, respectively. Accordingly, these
models measure whether the policy reform reduces long term welfare dependency. In
all models, the unemployment rate is lagged with 1year. This is done because people
enter welfare after their unemployment benefit expires.
In all model variants, the demographic variables have the expected sign. The proba-
bility of receiving welfare increases with age. Being single increases the probability of
being on welfare. Single parents have the largest probability of receiving welfare. The
degree of urbanisation (the number of persons living on a square kilometre) increases
the risk of receiving welfare allowances, as does the number of inhabitants of the
municipality. The unemployment rate has a positive sign, as expected.
Model 1 shows that the policy reform reduced the probability of being on welfare.
Predicting the probability of being on welfare with and without the reform implies
that, according to model 1, the probability of being on welfare in 2008 decreased
with 14% because of the policy change; this corresponds to a reduction of about 0.4
percentage points of the population at risk, or about 43,000 persons in 2008. In the
period 2000–2008 the welfare caseload declined from 376,000 recipients to 267,000
recipients (see Fig. 1). Thus, 39% of the total decline in this period can be attributed
to the policy change. Also, predicting the welfare caseload without a change in the
unemployment rate from 1999 to 2008 shows that 27% of the decline of the welfare
caseload can be attributed to the decrease in the unemployment rate.
Models 2 and 3 show that the policy reform reduces also long term welfare depen-
dency (4 or 8 quarters of a year or longer). The probability of being on welfare 4 and
8 consecutive quarters is decreased by respectively 13% and 12% due to the reform.
The policy reform thus not only induces municipalities to aim at ‘quick wins’ by deter-
ring potential entry or stimulate exit of easy-to-place welfare recipients. As expected,
the policy reform also induces municipalities to put effort in difficult to place recipi-
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Table 3 The impact of the reform on three different outcome measures
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Linear fixed effect models (robust clustered standard errors)
Outcome measure On/off welfare 4Q on/off welfare 8Q on/off welfare
Policy variable, not lagged −0.005*** (0.000) −0.004*** (0.000) −0.003*** (0.000)
Unemployment rate lagged 1year 0.238*** (0.019) 0.177*** (0.017) 0.096*** (0.016)
Ln age 0.056*** (0.002) 0.067*** (0.002) 0.058*** (0.002)
Couple (ref)
Single 0.019*** (0.000) 0.017*** (0.000) 0.012*** (0.000)
Single parents 0.029*** (0.001) 0.026*** (0.001) 0.017*** (0.001)
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Characteristics municipality
Population <15,000 (ref)
15,000–25,000 inhabitants 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
25,000–40,000 inhabitants 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
40,000–60,000 inhabitants 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
60,000–100,000 inhabitants 0.005*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000)
100,000–200,000 inhabitants 0.007*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.000)
>200,000 inhabitants 0.007*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
Degree of urbanisation Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummy (12 regions) Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.178*** (0.009) −0.221*** (0.008) −0.191*** (0.007)
Number of observations 29,127,632 29,127,632 29,127,632
Number of individuals 894,552 894,552 894,552
Source: Statistics Netherlands, own calculations
Corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of residuals
* Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level
ents, because they are rewarded with the expected value of all future payments to the
recipient.
To test the sensitivity of our model outcomes, we conducted various robustness
checks. First, we used values of the policy variable that were lagged with 1year (see
Table 4); the underlying idea is that municipalities may have needed time to adjust
to the reform. The outcomes show that lagging the policy variable hardly influences
the outcomes of the model. In particular, the effect is slightly smaller than the non-
lagged variable. It thus seems municipalities reacted promptly to the reform. Second,
we adopted a non-linear specification of the policy variable. We tested a quadratic
form and a square root. As the policy variable ranges from 0 to 1, the quadratic form
is convex, while the square root form is concave. With a quadratic specification, we
still observe a monotonously decreasing effect of the policy variable on the probability
of being on welfare. Likewise, welfare dependency still decreases with respect to the
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Table 4 The sensitivity of the results to different specifications of the policy variable
Outcome measure On/off welfare On/off welfare On/off welfare
Linear fixed effect models (robust clustered standard errors)
Policy variable, lagged 1year −0.004*** (0.000)
Policy variable squared, not lagged −0.004*** (0.000)
Policy variable square root, not lagged −0.005*** (0.000)
Unemployment rate lagged 1year 0.246*** (0.020) 0.234*** (0.018) 0.242*** (0.018)
Ln age 0.062*** (0.003) 0.055*** (0.002) 0.056*** (0.002)
Couple (ref)
Single 0.019*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000)
Single parents 0.028*** (0.000) 0.029*** (0.001) 0.029*** (0.001)
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Characteristics municipality
Population <15,000 (ref)
15,000–25,000 inhabitants 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
25,000–40,000 inhabitants 0.001** (0.001) 0.001** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001)
40,000–60,000 inhabitants 0.002*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
60,000-100,000 inhabitants 0.003*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001)
100,000–200,000 inhabitants 0.005*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001)
>200,000 inhabitants 0.005*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001)
Degree of urbanisation Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummy (12 regions) Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.201*** (0.010) −0.177** (0.008) −0.178*** (0.008)
Number of observations 25,544,107 29,127,632 29,127,632
Number of individuals 878,437 894,552 894,552
Source: Statistics Netherlands, own calculations
Corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of residuals
* Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level
policy variable if we allow for a concave function. However, the fit of the model is not
improved by either of these models.
To shed more light on heterogeneity in policy effects, model 1 has been estimated
on various demographic groups: couples, singles and single parents, and individuals
stratified by origin. We estimated the models for migrants of non-western origin on
the full population, as this group consist of around 10% of the Dutch population. The
estimations show the reform has been most effective for those with the highest welfare
dependency: single mothers and singles from non-western origin. The reform led to
a reduction of the probability of being on welfare in 2008 with 4.8%-point (24%) for
singles of non-western origin,with 4.4%-point (18%) for single parents of non-western
origin, and with 1.8%-point (22%) for single parents of Dutch or other western origin.
The decrease of the welfare caseload of other groups ranged from 0.8%-point (12%)
for couples of non-western origin, 0.6%-point (12%) for singles from Dutch origin to
0.1%-point (15%) for Dutch couples (Table 5).
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7 Conclusion and Discussion
The picture that emerges from our analysis is that the Dutch welfare reform proofs
successful in reducing the number of welfare recipient. The regression based block
grant reduced the welfare caseload with on average 14%. The effect is larger for
groups with the largest probability of being on welfare (persons from non-western
origin and single parents). At the same time, however, it should be stressed that small
municipalities still had no incentive to reduce their caseloads, as their budget was
determined on historical expenses.
Our findings also suggest that financial incentives of the budgeting system did not
only reduce the number of easy-to-place individuals, but also hard-to-place welfare
recipients. This in turn indicates that municipalities succeeded in translating these
incentives to the level of their caseworkers. Thus, although Dutch municipalities could
not change welfare eligibility rules as US states can since the 1996 reform, they
succeeded in reducing the welfare caseload. One way of doing so might have been
by active labour market policies, another by increasing monitoring and screening
activities.Municipalities indeed intensified enforcement policies after the reform (Kok
et al. 2007).
Although the welfare reform provides optimal incentives to reduce the welfare
caseload from the perspective of the municipality, this does not necessarily mean the
incentives are optimal from a societal perspective. From a societal perspective the
effects of the reform on employment should be taken into account. The decline of
the welfare caseload does not only stem from increased employment among former
potential recipients: not everyone that flows out (or does not flow in) will find a job.
Therefore, it would be interesting to address future research to the employment effects
of the policy reform.
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